

00335

1962/09/00

APPENDIX A

EXPANDED EVALUATION OF COURSES OF ACTION PROPOSED IN THE
BASIC PAPER TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVES
FOR CONSIDERATION

1. <u>Indirect Actions</u>	1
a. <u>Intensify Efforts to Extend Denial of Landing and</u>	2
<u>Overflight Rights to Planes Enroute to Cuba</u>	3
<u>Advantages</u>	4
- With a minimum of effort this will deny entry of air-	5
craft into Cuba except from bases within aircraft range and	6
in countries friendly to Cuba.	
- Avoids necessity of halting aircraft by force with the	8
attendant risks.	
<u>Disadvantages</u>	10
- Fails to provide for removal of existing threat or	11
hostile Castro government.	12
- Dependent upon cooperation of many Allies.	13
b. <u>OAS or US Demand Castro Destroy or Remove From the</u>	14
<u>Hemisphere all Offensive Weapons and Submit to Inspection</u>	15
<u>and Verification by OAS</u>	16
<u>Advantages</u>	17
- Avoids further heightening of tensions and dangers of	18
escalation.	19
- If successful, achieves objective of obtaining removal	20
of offensive weapons.	21
<u>Disadvantages</u>	22
- Fails to remove hostile Castro government.	23
- Enforcement in sufficient degree to prevent clandestine	24
reintroduction of offensive weapons would be difficult.	25
[c.]	26
	27
	28
<u>Advantages</u>	29
- Improves effectiveness of OAS inspection.	30

E-C
E-C

]

Disadvantages

- Same as in b above.

[d.]

Advantages

- [

[

- [

Disadvantages

- [

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

[2. []
[]

Advantages

- []

- []

Disadvantages

- []

b. Expansion of current Blockade to Include POL

Advantages

- Could eventually be effective enough to degrade significantly the offensive military threat in Cuba.
- Would prevent the increase in POL supply stocks over that currently available.
- Would eventually bring on the economic collapse of Cuba and the attendant fall of the Castro government.
- would generate unrest in general in Cuba through effects on economy and the people.
- could cause Castro to consider removal of the offensive weapons.
- Demonstrates US restraint in avoiding direct attack on Cuba.

Disadvantages

- Fails to remove offensive threat to US expeditiously
- Would produce effects sufficiently severe to encourage encourage serious retaliatory measures by USSR and/or Cuba.
- Directly affects Cuban people through impact on economy, making US more vulnerable to condemnation.
- Fails to insure removal of the hostile communist controlled government from Cuba.
- Requires indefinite continuation of blockade until such time as Castro regime eliminated and Soviet influence removed.

c. EXPANDING EXISTING BLOCKADE TO INCLUDE ONLY FUELS FOR AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES.

Advantages

- Avoids impact on Cuban economy and people and the resulting criticism of US.
- Prevents increasing stocks of these fuels for Cuba's offensive weapons.
- Demonstrates US restraint and effort to avoid outright conflict.

Disadvantages

- Fails to eliminate current offensive threat
- Does not contribute to anti-Castro efforts in Cuba

d. Complete Sea Blockade of all Imports

Advantages

- Would lead to economic collapse of Cuba.
- Avoids direct attack on Cuba with its attendant casualties and damage.
- Demonstrates US restraint and avoidance of war.
- Provides environment for further negotiations for removal of offensive weapons.

Disadvantages

- Fails to eliminate existing offensive weapon threat in time available.
- Perpetuates tension and promotes incidents which could provide the basis for expanding into war.
- Complete blockade affects Cuban people directly rather than being limited principally to the military, making US more vulnerable to condemnation.
- Even if blockade should result in successful termination it would leave a hostile communist-controlled state to continue to threaten Western Hemisphere and would not insure against introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba.
- Ties up US forces for an indefinite period.

e. Adding Blockade to Prevent Entry into and Departure of Aircraft from Cuba

Advantages

- Complements sea blockade by preventing introduction of important cargo by air.
- Eliminates communication through aerial flights between Cuba and the rest of the world.
- Provides further harassment which might encourage Castro to consider removal of offensive weapons.

Disadvantages

- Might provoke similar USSR reaction elsewhere, e.g., Berlin.
- Provides basis for incidents which might escalate to war.
- Not a decisive step in the elimination of the Cuban threat or the Castro government.
- Would be of indefinite duration.

F. Air Strikes Against All Offensive Weapons Systems

Missiles and Combat Aircraft, as well as Related Air Defense Systems as necessary

Advantages

- Eliminates immediate threat and so accomplishes stated objective.
- Minimizes risks of Cuban attacks on the United States or Allies since entire offensive system is destroyed.

Disadvantages

- Leaves Cuba in the hands of a hostile communist regime which will remain a threat to the Western Hemisphere.
- Requires a continuing blockade or similar surveillance system capable of preventing the reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba.
- Entails essentially the same risks of escalation as an all-out invasion with less promise of achievement of lasting results.

g. All-Out Invasion of Cuba

Advantages

- Achieves US stated objective (eliminates missiles and sites, combat aircraft and the Castro regime from the Western Hemisphere).

- Confidence in US determination to take all necessary actions to remove threats to the Free World will be materially enhanced with beneficial effects on our Allies and nonaligned nations.

- The communist threat in Latin America would be considerably weakened.

- Re-establishment of Cuba as a free and independent nation with a viable economy will erase in the long run early criticism of US military actions.

Disadvantages

- Belated recourse to this course of action would reduce its effectiveness.

- United States might be denounced as an aggressor in the United Nations.

- Soviets could cause violent reactions in Berlin against US interests throughout the world.

- Could lead to general war if the Soviets miscalculated US intentions and determinations.

- World opinion could go against the US instigated by Soviet propaganda media.

- Greater likelihood of Cuban attempts to launch offensive missiles, as an act of desperation. This would probably require Soviet acquiescence which is doubtful in view of the Presidential warning.

TOP SECRET

3. Additional courses of action are covered below. Any or
all of these can be taken concurrently with any action directly
concerned with Cuba. Each is designed to pose the Soviets with
a problem of how to proceed, always indicating to the Soviets
the choice of removing the offensive weapons from Cuba is the
quickest way to remove the irritation.

a. Closing US Ports and Airfields to Soviet Ships and

Aircraft:

Advantages

- Restricts Soviet freedom of movement.
- Restricts Soviet trade.
- Reduces Soviet intelligence opportunities.
- Reduces the danger of Soviet covert attack.

Disadvantages

- Reduces communications and contact between the US
and USSR.
- Reduces US/USSR trade and forces USSR to trade
elsewhere.

b. [

Advantages

- Would weaken Cuban and Soviet ability to maintain
and increase military threat to the United States.
- Would tend to weaken control of Castro government
and Soviet confidence in it.

Disadvantages

- Would require considerable time to produce desired
effect.

Advantages

- []
- []
- []

Disadvantages

- []
- []

6. Economic Action. Implement a master offensive economic plan with the primary objective of sharply reducing the flow of industrial, agricultural and military material reaching the USSR and its satellites. Concurrently, take action to reduce selected imports from the USSR.

Advantages

- Would reduce the economic stability of the USSR.
- Could divert critical USSR resources to undesirable channels.
- Would restrict flow of material required to sustain USSR defense effort.

Disadvantages

- Adverse reaction from Allied nations.
- Heavier load on US resources to fill vacuum.
- Success depends on Allied cooperation.

APPENDIX B

SCENARIO OF LIMITED ATTACK ON MREM SITES AND JET FIELDS

A. Factual Background

The IREM sites and associated nuclear storage facilities are still under construction and do not constitute a present threat. The present offensive threat appears to be concentrated in the six MREM areas and the five jet fields available to the IL28's and MIG's.

An air attack concentrated on these 11 targets, plus defense suppression including the 8 SAM sites immediately protecting these eleven targets should therefore deal with the heart of the present offensive threat.

Because of the impossibility of assuring night time surveillance, adequate force to assure disabling of all offensive systems in the eleven target areas during the initial attack should be provided.

What is under discussion in this paper is, therefore, a one day attack on eleven target areas, accompanied by necessary defense suppression. Such an attack might involve approximately 250 sorties.

B. The Problem

To analyze the actions which should have preceded such an attack.

C. Assumptions

It is assumed that:

a. The Soviet Union has vetoed the U.S. resolution in the Security Council.

b. We have no evidence that removal or dismantling of existing offensive systems has begun.

D. Possible Courses of Action

a. To increase public and Allied understanding and to increase political ability of program.

Publication of progressive series of low level
photographs demonstrating continued work or, at minimum,
lack of action to remove.

2. High level statements reiterating President's pledge
that offensive threat must be removed, emphasizing determina-
tion to see this done.

3. Warnings to workers to leave areas.

4. Intensive explanation to Allies of extent of threat
to base of their security that MREB's pose, and inference
of our intended action at earliest time consistent with
security.

b. [

[

[

[

1. [

2. [

3. [

4. [

c. Expected effectiveness.

~~SECRET~~
The attack would damage and destroy virtually all of those ~~jets~~ and jet aircraft located at the target areas. This will include a large proportion and maybe all of these vehicles now operational in Cuba. Some may now be concealed or may be moved and concealed between today and the time of attack.

[

1. [

2. [

3. [

]

]

]

]

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

13